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Abstract 
In this work, we explore the authentication and verification of key exchange protocol using Message Authentication Code (MAC). 
We propose a new MAC scheme model using input-output automata to protect the integrity of the secret key in the key exchange 
protocol. Our scheme was devised in reference to the Diffie-Hellman communication protocol model. We divided our MAC 
protocol into three stages of communication sequences in order to simplify the model and the design of automata machine. In the 
final result, we combined all stages and represented the protocol as Cryptographic MAC Protocol in the regular language. We have 
shown that the cryptographic MAC protocol for key exchange protocol can be implemented using finite input-output automata 
with some small modification of the finite state machine. The proposed protocol would be useful for implementation in a 
lightweight or a secure smart devices communication in the wireless sensor nodes (WSN) network. 
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1. Introduction 
Lightweight security applications that are offers high security services such as authentication and confidentiality to 
contemporary network technologies such as “Internet of Things” and “Cloud Computing” are expected to facilitate 
and accelerate the growth and popularity of these technological platforms. In these environments, authentication plays 
a major role in securing the communication for the purpose of ensuring the legitimacy of the transmitted data as well 
as the communicating parties [1]. In practice, a message authentication codes or MAC is sent together with the message 
via a secure channel. The MAC is derived from a hash function of the message with the secret key as its variable. 
Since the sender and the receiver have the same secret key, both parties will be able to recompute the MAC using their 
shared variables. Automata Theory is one of the common ways to engineer the MAC. There are several types of 
automaton that are suitable for security purposes such as cellular, input-output, asynchronous product, tree and timed 
automata. In this work, we focus on modeling our MAC scheme using the input-output variant due to its practicality 
to our model. 
Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange (DHKE) protocol is use to exchange a cryptographic key between two parties that 
have no prior knowledge of each other and to establish a key exchange between them over insecure communication 
channels [2]–[4]. The Diffie-Hellman algorithm was developed by Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman in 1976 as a 
major breakthrough in the asymmetric key encryption. It serves the purposes to generate a same private cryptographic 
key at both end-points (e.g. client and server) so that there is no need to transfer this key from one communication end 
to another end in physical manner. The primitive mathematical strength of this algorithm that is relies on the Discreet 
Log Hard Problem (DLHP) wherein to find private exponential number is intractable [4]. This algorithm is proven 
secure with proper usage and combined with Message Authentication Code (MAC) [3]. A commendable security 
property from this algorithm is to provide secure key exchange in the TFTP communication. Therefore, the product 
or key generated from this algorithm can be used for AES128 and AES256 in the data encryption. 
In the next section, we present the literature review of previous works done on security protocol using some of the 
most common automata. Section 3 briefly describes our motivation and objective. We present our model in Section 4 
followed by the security analysis in Section 5. The result and discussion are discussed in Section 6 and 7. Section 8 
concludes the research work. 
 
2. Related Work 
There are several ways to use automata engineering security protocol as well as in checking the protocol model. 
Wolfram (1986) [5] is the founder of cellular automata-based cryptographic scheme for symmetric encryption 
protocol. The proposed protocol is implemented in stream cipher using one-dimensional N cells of cellular automata. 
Timed automaton as proposed by Alur et al. (1994) [6] is a methodology to model a system in real time as well as 
Kurkowski et al. (2009) [7] for verifying timed security protocols in a computer network among finite users with the 
presence of an intruder. Cellular automata are also used for the message and image authentication scheme as proposed 
by Mukherjee, Ganguly et al. (2002) [8]. The scheme is said to be highly secure against current security threats and 
highly efficient for real-time system implementation as well as VLSI production with high authentication throughput. 
Needham-Schroeder protocol is described using asynchronous product automata (APA) (Gürgens et. al 2002) [9]. 
Needham-Schroeder protocol is a key distribution protocol from a key server S to agents A and B, making all S, A 
and B as elementary automata with 4 states each in APA.  
Bao (2004) [10] states that most of the previous cellular automata cryptosystems are vulnerable to cryptanalysis 
like chosen-plaintext attack. Only hundreds of chosen plaintexts are required to break the cipher text from the 
cryptosystem as compared to the minimal security benchmark of  ʹ଼଴ chosen plaintexts. Furthermore, the attacker 
does not need to know the cryptosystem design in order to break the code. Corin, et al. (2004) [11] proposed  security 
protocol checking based on timing information of the protocol. To consider the time factor in a security protocol, timed 
automata is used in engineering the security model. One benefit of using timed automata in the protocol checking is 
the protocol performance becomes highly translucent with the accurate and thorough protocol specification.  
Finite automata is used to analyze complexity of Dolev–Yao [12] model of security protocols using a notation based 
on multi-set rewriting with existentials (Durgin, et al. 2004) [13]. Blundo, et al. (2004) [14] experimented with input-
output automata as a tool to describe and verify the security of cryptographic protocols that run in an asynchronous 
distributed system. Using this security verification procedure, some security properties of a certified email protocol 
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can be checked after it has been examined and formalized using IOA model.  We choose this automata model due to 
its feasibility and ability to permit precise description of the code with detailed proofs via its framework. Similar work 
on verifying and analyzing security protocols have been done on a shared key communication protocol and Diffie-
Hellman key distribution protocol as presented in (Lynch 1999) [15]. 
Rey (2007) [16] presented a secure message communication using finite cellular automata as hash function to 
prevent same hash digest for different messages or packets. Hash function is used to map memory cellular automata 
with ݇-length hash digest as message integrity. Cellular automaton in MAC utilizes transition function to provide a 
chain of message integrity as hash digest. Reitzig (2008) [17] proposed utilizing finite automata for modelling and 
proving system security using formalism of system properties. Kurkowski et al. (2009) [7] used timed automata for 
verifying timed security protocols in a computer network among finite users with the presence of an intruder. Similar 
work was also done by Koltuksuz et al. (2010) [18] to verify Neuman-Stubblebine Repeated Authentication Protocol 
by building a finite model of the system and navigating through all of the accessible states. Liu et al. (2009) [19] 
defined security protocol using approximation-based model and came up with an algorithm design that is analogous 
to the real implementation. This design is used to calculate fix-point tree automata based on the tool called TA4SP. 
Furthermore, the authors proposed hierarchy analysis on authentication properties as extension to TA4SP. 
Comparably, Gennaro et al. (2010) [20] applied tree automata in analysis of cryptographic protocols based on abstract 
interpretation and regular tree languages. Oliveira et al. (2010) [21] implemented cellular automata in Variable-Length 
Encryption Method (VLE) for symmetric encryption scheme. The VLE produces shorter cipher text with high level of 
randomness in the text known as encryption entropy. This is to strengthen the scheme against differential cryptanalysis 
via transition rules in the automata and spaces as specifications. 
In our previous work, we have conducted an experiment using RaspberryPi ARM [22] board to enable secure TFTP 
communication between client and server. The secure key exchange is derived from cryptographic algorithms such as 
DHKE [2], [4] Cramer-Shoup [23] and El-Gamal [24] encryption schemes. For an extensive implementation details 
of our secure protocol with a security proofs, one may refer to our latest works (2014) in the research papers “An 
Experimental study of Cryptography Capability using Chained Key Exchange Scheme for Embedded Devices” [25], 
“A Secure TFTP Protocol with Security Proofs” [26] and “Performance Measurement of Secure TFTP Protocol for 
Smart Embedded Devices” [27].  
 
3. Motivation 
Our main motivation in proposing the Message Authentication Code (MAC) scheme using input-output automata 
is to protect the integrity of the key in the key exchange protocol. To explore the possible constraints in the theoretical 
and formal designs, we have decided to use hashing algorithm such as SHA1 that provides 160-bit of integrity value. 
We consider the communication between two parties with the presence of an eavesdropper as the adversary. The main 
purpose of the above scenario is to show that automata can be used to model MAC as well as to verify its security 
using outsider adversary threat model. We assume that the adversary tries to forge the MAC and the secret key in the 
communication channel, but it will fail. The objective of this paper is to explore Message Authentication Code (MAC) 
scheme using finite input-output automata for message integrity verification in the unsecure communication channel.  
 
4. Proposed MAC Automaton 
 
4.1. MAC Protocol & Key Exchange Protocol 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1: General protocol for MAC in the Key Exchange Protocol 
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Fig. 3.  Summary states in the Stage 1 
 
4.2. Definition and Formalism 
• ܽǡ ܾǡ ݃ǡ ݌ǡ ܣǡ ܤǡ ܭ א  ሼͲǡͳሽכǣ ݏ݅ݖ݁݂݋ݎ݁ݒ݁ݎݕ݈݁݁݉݁݊ݐݏ݅ݏ2048-bit  (1) 
• ܪ ׷ ܪܽݏ݄݈ܽ݃݋ݎ݅ݐ݄݉   (2) 
• ܶ ׷ ܶݎܽ݊ݏ݉݅ݏݏ݅݋݊݋ݒ݁ݎ݊݁ݐݓ݋ݎ݇   (3) 
• ̶^" ׷ ܧݔ݌݋݊݁݊ݐ݈݅ܽݏݕܾ݉݋݈   (4) 
• ̶=" ׷ ܥ݋݉݌ܽݎ݁ݏݕܾ݉݋݈   (5) 
• ̶M" ׷ ܯ݋݀ݑ݈ܽݎݏݕܾ݉݋݈   (6) 
• ܴǡ ܵ א  ሼͲǡͳሽכǡ ȁܴȁ ൌ ͳ͸Ͳ-bit &ȁܵȁ ൌ ͳ͸Ͳ-bit  (7) 
• ܮܽ݊݃ݑܽ݃݁ǡ ࡸሺࡹ࡭࡯ሻ ൌ  ሺछǡ ઱ǡ ࢾǡ ࢗ࢕ǡ ࡲሻǣ  (8) 
o ࣫ǣܣ݈݈݂݅݊݅ݐ݁ݏݐܽݐ݁ݏ݅݊ݐ݄݁ݏݐܽ݃݁ͳݐ݋͵ 
o ȭ ׷ ܣ݈݈݈ܽ݌݄ܾܽ݁ݐݏ݂ݎ݋݉ሺͳሻݐ݋ሺ͹ሻ  
o ߜ ׷ ࣫ ൈ ߑǡ ߜǣݐݎܽ݊ݏ݅ݐ݅݋݊݂ݑ݊ܿݐ݅݋݊ 
o ݍ଴ א ࣫ǡ ݍ଴ǣ ݅݊݅ݐ݈݅ܽݏݐܽݐ݁݅݊ݐ݄݁ݏݐܽ݃݁ͳݐ݋͵ 
o ܨ ك ࣫ǡܨǣ ݏ݁ݐ݋݂ܽܿܿܿ݁݌ݐ݅݊݃ݏݐܽݐ݁ݏ݅݊ݐ݄݁ݏݐܽ݃݁ͳݐ݋͵ 
 
4.3. Cryptographic MAC Protocol in Key Exchange Protocol. 
Stage 1: 
ܣ ؠ ݃௔ሺ݉݋݀݌ሻ        (9) 
 
Stage 2: 
ܤ ؠ ݃௕ሺ݉݋݀݌ሻ        (10) 
ܲݎ݅ݒܽݐ݁ܭ݁ݕǡ ܭ ؠ ܣ஻ሺ݉݋݀݌ሻ      (11) 
ܯܣܥ஻ ؠ ܪܽݏ݄൫ܭหܣȁܤሻ       (12) 
 
Stage 3: 
ܲݎ݅ݒܽݐ݁ܭ݁ݕǡ ܭ ؠ ܤ஺ሺ݉݋݀݌ሻ      (13) 
ܯܣܥ஺ ؠ ܪܽݏ݄൫ܭหܣȁܤሻ       (14) 
ܥ݋݉݌ܽݎ݁ܯܣܥ஺ ൌ ܯܣܥ஻       (15) 
 
4.4. Automata Machine 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Fig. 2.  Nondeterministic Finite Automaton (NFA) in Stage 1 
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Fig. 6.  Deterministic Finite Automaton (DFA) in the Stage 2 
Fig. 8.  Summary states in the Stage 3 
Fig. 5.  Nondeterministic Finite Automaton (NFA) in Stage 2 
Fig. 4.  Deterministic Finite Automaton (DFA) in the Stage 1 
Fig. 7.  Summary states in the Stage 2 
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5. Analysis of Automaton 
 
5.1. Language and Regular Expression for Stage 1 
 
ܮሺܵݐܽ݃݁ͳሻ ൌ ሼ א ȭכ ׷ ܣܿܿ݁݌ݐ݋݈݊ݕݏݐݎ݅݊݃ݏݔݓ݅ݐ݄ࢍ̰ࢇࡹ࢖ࢀሽ 
 
ሺࢍ̰ࢇࡹ࢖ࢀሻ* 
5.2. Language and Regular Expression for Stage 2 
ܮሺܵݐܽ݃݁ʹሻ ൌ ሼ א ȭכ ׷ ܣܿܿ݁݌ݐ݋݈݊ݕݏݐݎ݅݊݃ݏݔݓ݅ݐ݄ࢍ̰࢈ࡹ࢖࡭̰࢈ࡹ࢖ࡴࡷ࡭࡮ࢀሽ 
 
ሺࢍ̰࢈ࡹ࢖࡭̰࢈ࡹ࢖ࡴࡷ࡭࡮ࢀሻ* 
5.3. Language and Regular Expression for Stage 3 
ܮሺܵݐܽ݃݁ʹሻ ൌ ሼ א ȭכǣܣܿܿ݁݌ݐ݋݈݊ݕݏݐݎ݅݊݃ݏݔݓ݅ݐ݄࡮̰ࢇࡹ࢖ࡴࡷ࡭࡮ࡿ ൌ ࡾሽ 
 
ሺ࡮̰ࢇࡹ࢖ࡴࡷ࡭࡮ࡿ ൌ ࡾሻ* 
 
6. Results 
6.1. Language in MAC Protocol for Key Exchange Protocol 
ࡸሺࡹ࡭࡯ሻ
ൌ  ሼ࢞ א ࢳכǣܣܿܿ݁݌ݐ݋݈݊ݕݏݐݎ݅݊݃ݏݔݓ݅ݐ݄ሺࢍ̰ࢇࡹ࢖ࢀሻכሺࢍ̰࢈ࡹ࢖࡭̰࢈ࡹ࢖ࡴࡷ࡭࡮ࢀሻכሺ࡮̰ࢇࡹ࢖ࡴࡷ࡭࡮ࡿ
ൌ ࡾሻכሽ
Fig. 10.  Deterministic Finite Automaton (DFA) in the Stage 3 
Fig. 9.  Nondeterministic Finite Automaton (NFA) in Stage 3 
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( (g^aMpT)* ሺࢍ̰࢈ࡹ࢖࡭̰࢈ࡹ࢖ࡴࡷ࡭࡮ࢀሻ* ሺ࡮̰ࢇࡹ࢖ࡴࡷ࡭࡮ࡿ ൌ ࡾሻ* )* 
 
7. Discussion 
In section 4, we have shown that the Cryptographic MAC Protocol for Key Exchange Protocol can be 
implemented using finite input-output automata with slight modification. We used JFLAP Thin 7.0 to model and test 
our automaton machine. As illustrated in Figure 1 to Figure 10, we have divided our MAC protocol into three stages 
of communication sequences in order to simplify the model and the design of automata machine. We latter combined 
all stages as shown in section 6 as the final product of cryptographic MAC protocol in the regular language. 
The idea to utilize cellular automata in security protocol was proposed in 1986 by Wolfram [28]. To date, 
this type of security protocol is only practical for implementation in symmetric encryption scheme. The scheme based 
on cellular automata proposed by Mukherjee et al [8] is suitable for message and image authentication. In 2007, MAC 
system that used cellular automata for its hashing algorithm is proposed Rey [16]. After that, Oliveira [21] 
implemented cellular automata in Variable-Length Encryption Method for bulk data encryption such as Secure File 
Transfer Protocol. 
The aforementioned schemes seem to be incompatible with our idea. Since our proposed protocol does not 
require the property of randomness and hashing algorithm derived from cellular automata. Nevertheless, the chosen-
plaintext attack on cellular automata protocol discussed by Bao [10] provides some guidelines for our to design the 
key exchange protocol and MAC models. The work done by Oliveira [21] is the most comparable to our proposed 
model. Though there is a discussion on client-server security protocol that relates to key exchange. However, the 
Oliveira’s model was designed for security policy only, instead of cryptographic key exchange protocol and MAC. 
We compare our implementation to Lynch [15] that is uses automaton to model, analyze and verify key exchange 
protocol such as Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange (DHKE) protocol. Our implementation also support outsider adversary 
threat model for security analysis and security proving. This research work is the complement of our previous work 
[25]–[27], [29] in providing secure I/O communication in the embedded systems such as sensor nodes security. 
 
8. Conclusion 
Since 1986, finite automata have been used widely for modeling and designing security model as well as 
constructing pseudo random functions. In later decades, automata are used for security implementation in network 
security protocol (e.g. client-server system). The use of finite automata in modeling security protocol enables formal 
proving on its security. We used Lynch’s model [15] as reference model for designing and modeling our very own 
MAC scheme based on adversary model, Diffie-Hellman communication protocol model and environment models. 
We have modeled our new MAC protocol for key exchange protocol using input-output automata due to its 
practicality. For future work, we plan to check our model using timed automata and formal methods to verify the 
proposed MAC protocol in term of several properties that are including liveness, safety, deadlock-free and starvation-
free. 
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